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Jury Center :: Juries In-depth ::
Protecting venirepersons’ personal information that is elicited during the jury selection process One of the hallmarks of court proceedings in a democracy is that they should be as open as possible so the press and the public can scrutinize the process. This helps keep the system honest and above-board. Thus, the system has an interest in making public most of what goes on with respect to a trial, including all the personal information disclosed during the jury selection process. And of course, the litigants have a desire to elicit as much of the venirepersons’ personal information as possible for the purpose of exercising challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. On the other hand, most venirepersons would generally prefer not to expose personal information to public view, and many venirepersons have specific sensitive facts about themselves that they have a strong desire to keep private. In most cases, trial judges do not take measures to keep information elicited during jury selection under wraps. But the Supreme Court gave trial judges some leeway to keep such information private in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). There the Court held that for compelling reasons, for example, deeply personal matters, a trial judge can take protective measures like closing a portion of the voir dire to the public or ordering the records of voir dire sealed from public view. Still, there is a strong presumption in favor of making such matters public that must be overcome before such measures can be properly ordered. Some good reading sources on the topic of keeping jurors’ jury selection disclosures secret include: Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing Privacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 Rev. Litig. 285 (2002). David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 Temple L. Rev. 1 (1997).
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